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PRIVACY PRESERVING HIPAA-COMPLIANT ACCESS 
CONTROL MODEL FOR WEB SERVICES 
ABSTRACT 
Software applications are developed to help companies and organizations 
process and manage data that support their daily operations. However, this data might 
contain sensitive clients’ information that should be protected to ensure the clients’ 
privacy. Besides losing the clients’ trust, neglecting to ensure the clients’ data privacy 
may also be unlawful and inflict serious legal and financial consequences. Lately, 
different laws and regulations related to data privacy have been enacted specially in 
vital sectors such as health care, finance, and accounting. Those regulations dictate how 
clients’ data should be disclosed and transmitted within the organization as well as with 
external partners. The privacy rules in these laws and regulations presented a challenge 
for software engineers who design and implement the software applications used in 
processing the clients’ private data. The difficulty is linked to the complexity and length 
of the letter of the law and how to guarantee that the software application is maintaining 
the clients’ data privacy in compliance with the law. 
Some healthcare organization are trying to perform their own interpretation of 
the law privacy rules by creating custom systems. However, the problems with such 
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approach is that the margin of error while interpreting the letter of the law is high 
specially with separate efforts carried out by individual companies. According to a 
survey carried out to check the Healthcare Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) requirements interpretation created for medical and healthcare related 
applications, none of the frameworks were well developed to capture the relationships 
specified in the law. To solve this problem, a standard framework is required that will 
analyze the regulatory text and provide a method to extract the relevant component that 
can be used during software roles engineering and development. The extracted 
components will include all the possible arrangements of roles, purposes, permissions, 
temporal factors, and any carried out obligations. 
In this work we propose a framework to analyze, extract, model, and enforce the 
privacy requirements from HIPAA regulatory text. The framework goal is to translate 
the law privacy rules text into more manageable components in the form of entities, 
roles, purposes, and obligations. Those components together can be used as building 
blocks to create formal privacy policies. The process concentrates on two main 
components; entities and their roles, and data access context. To accomplish the first 
part, the framework will parse the privacy sections of the regulatory text to mine all the 
subjects, and then categorize those subjects into roles based on their characterization in 
the law. To acquire the access context, the process will extract all the purposes, 
temporal clauses and any carried out obligations and classify them based on their 
permissibility.  
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CHAPTER 1: INRTODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
On August 1996, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) passed by the U.S. Congress, defining a set of rules to protect patients' health 
information and privacy. Those privacy rules in HIPAA apply to all individually 
identifiable information [1]. 
HIPAA introduced a challenge for healthcare information systems that maintain 
patients’ information; as every operation that uses or discloses healthcare information – 
defined by HIPAA as Protected Health Information (PHI) – needs to comply with 
HIPAA privacy rules. Violation of these rules may result in significant penalties that may 
include substantial fines. 
The lack of a common system that can be implemented by any company’s 
information system led to the need for a platform-independent system that implements an 
access control model to preserve the privacy of PHI in any covered entity system. Using 
web services can fulfill this need as a web service is a software system designed to 
support interoperable application-to-application interaction over a network [2]. 
Recently, healthcare applications are moving toward adopting web services 
technologies due to its interoperability, which helps solving the issue of incompatible 
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systems and languages to share information. Also, web services have rich properties such 
as service compositions and reusable components that makes it more desirable as a 
communication platform [3–4]. 
Web services utilize a set of eXtensible Markup Language (XML) standards like 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Universal Description, Discovery and 
Integration (UDDI), and Web Services Description Language (WSDL), which gives web 
services a standardize implementation sense. This helps in the creation of a standard 
privacy access control model that implements HIPAA privacy rules. The access control 
model is embedded in a web service, which then can be applied to any existing software 
system. 
Such a model meets the set of requirements to comply with HIPAA rules as well 
as any standard privacy access control model. 
1.2 Research Problem and Scope 
The objective of this research is to create a HIPAA-compliant Access control 
model that uses HIPAA privacy rules as criteria source in the access decision process. 
Taking into consideration that such a system should be able to handle heterogonous 
environments and be implemented as a gateway to access existing covered entities’ 
software systems. 
The problems we are trying to solve can be divided into three categories: HIPAA 
modeling and formalizations complexity, designing a HIPAA-compliant access control 
 
 
3 
that takes into consideration multiple context factors, and finally the implementation of 
the model as an add-on on top of existing software systems. 
1.2.1 HIPAA Modeling Complexity 
Several issues complicate the process of extracting the context request from 
HIPAA or any regulatory text in general. The most notable issues that affect HIPAA 
modeling are: the complexity of legal document language, the legal document structure, 
and cross-references and exceptions. 
1.2.2 Context and Model parameters 
To design the access control model, we need to define the context and factor it as 
parameters to the system. The parameters should enumerate all the possible combination 
of roles, permissions, purposes, obligations, and any temporal factors. 
1.2.3 System Implementation 
The system design should have a minimal overhead when implemented to an 
existing system. Also, it should consider the fact that those systems are heterogeneous 
and should be able to communicate with each other with additional translation layer or 
extra implementation. This requires the system to be interoperable and to use a standard 
policy language. 
1.3 Motivation behind the Research 
The lack of a common system that can be implemented by any company’s 
information system led to the need for a platform-independent system that implements an 
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access control model to preserve the privacy of all Protected Health Information (PHI) in 
any covered entity system. 
The key motive behind this research was to review the current implementations 
and design a model that can solve the problems highlighted in Section 1.2 by providing 
an access control model based on the rules and logic extracted directly from the 
regulatory text letter of the law. 
1.4 Potential Contributions of the Proposed Research 
The main contribution of this research is to create a context-based privacy access 
control model embedded within a platform-independent service-oriented system utilizing 
web services. However, in order to achieve this goal, we need to solve the research 
problems. The outcome of each problem is considered a contribution by itself. Similar to 
the research problems, those secondary contributions can also be categorized into three 
contributions: 
1. Create a robust process that can model, extract data, and formalize HIPAA 
privacy rules. 
2.  Design privacy policy, access request, and access response format that uses the 
request context and implement a mechanism for enforcing the law using a 
context-based decision engine. 
3. Embedding the policies and the decision engine in the web service layers. 
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1.5 Research Organization 
This research consists of six chapters followed by bibliography. The work is 
organized as follows: 
Introduction: This chapter provides an overview of the research problem and 
scope. Also, it highlights the motivation behind the research and the potential 
contributions. 
Literature Survey: Chapter 2 provides background knowledge of the research 
topic. It includes the current access models, formalization methods, and using web 
services in healthcare applications. It also reviews the related work in those fields and 
how that can be used in this research. 
Research Plan: this chapter discusses the process to formalize HIPAA rules into 
clear policies. Then it shows the features required in an access control model to express 
the formalized rules, and how to represent the policies in a service-oriented environment 
using web services as an access point. 
Implementation and Test Plan: Chapter 4 shows initial implementation of the 
web service and how the privacy policies are embedded within the web services. It also 
explains the test plan that was carried on the system in order to validate the system design 
and integrity.  
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Results: Using the test plan from Chapter 4, this chapter demonstrates the test 
results and then provides a brief analysis of those results.  
Conclusions: The last chapter is a summary of the research outcome. It concludes 
the model design and limitations. Also, it paves the road for the possible future work and 
enhancements that can be applied to the proposed model. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 HIPAA Overview 
Initially sponsored by Ted Kennedy and Nancy Kassebaum, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was passed by the U.S. congress and signed 
by President Bill Clinton in 1996 [5]. The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) classifies HIPAA into five top-level titles covering different healthcare-
related topics [6]. Those titles are classified based on rules main topic such as group 
provisioning and revenue, accessibility and portability, privacy, security, and taxation. 
Each title is then divided into subtitles that focus on more specific idea in the same parent 
topic [7].  
In this work, our concentration will be on the privacy laws specified in Title 2. 
Preventing health care fraud and abuse (administrative simplification), which includes:  
transactions and code sets; identifiers; privacy; and security. The concentration of this 
work will be on the privacy section of the law, more specifically, subpart E of Part 164 
covering §164.502 to §164.528 [1, 8]. These rules identify the security and privacy 
requirements applicable to any Protected Health Information (PHI) within Covered 
Entities. According to HHS, HIPAA covered entities are defined as health plan providers, 
healthcare providers, health care clearinghouses, or any other entity that maintains and 
 
 
8 
discloses PHI in any form or media regulated by HIPAA, where PHI refers to 
individually identifiable health information that identifies an individual and relates to 
past, present, or future physical and mental health disorders, illnesses, and conditions. 
HIPAA privacy rules regulate, defines, and limits the purpose of PHI usage within 
the covered entity scope, as well as the purpose of PHI disclosure between covered 
entities. Based on the purpose, PHI usage or disclosure may require the PHI owner 
preauthorization or add an obligation to notify the owner of the action. 
2.2 HIPAA Formalization 
In the U.S., numerous federal laws and regulations were legislated to guarantee 
individuals’ right to be able to access and port their private information stored and 
managed by service providers while protecting that information from unauthorized 
access. For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 [9] is designed to 
protect individuals’ financial information from being breached without proper 
authorization. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 
is another example, section 164 of HIPAA is intended explicitly to protect patients’ 
healthcare information and medical records from unauthorized disclosure. According to 
HIPAA, any healthcare related information that can identify an individual and can be 
stored or transmitted via any media format is defined as Protected Health Information 
(PHI). HIPAA privacy rules control the storage, transmission, and disclosure of all 
Protected Health Information. Usually the PHI is collected and maintained by healthcare 
insurance plan, healthcare provider, healthcare clearinghouse or any other similar 
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organization identified by HIPAA as Covered Entity. Comparable privacy rules can also 
be found in other federal regulations as well. 
The legal language of HIPAA is too dense and complex to be used as a guide by 
computer programmers and information technology professionals responsible for 
developing and managing software systems for healthcare companies required to comply 
with the law. Hence, the need to formalize the laws into a logical format that can be 
applied easily to automated systems and can be tested for compliance. 
Recent researches show a variety of proposed solutions to the problem of 
formalizing privacy laws expressed in a number of logics: [10–12], and different 
languages: [13–15]. Those logics and languages were proposed to permit implementing 
the privacy laws in a simple way that can be tested for compliance easily and be able to 
specify if a request for data transmission or access is allowed. 
Regardless of the wide variety of privacy languages and logics proposed above, 
most of them are either too complex to implement, or just covering a subset of the law as 
a Proof of Concept (POC). 
2.2.1 HIPAA Formalization Complexity 
The U.S. federal regulations documents are written in a complex format and 
technical language known as legalese. Legalese or legal English uses different vocabulary 
and syntax than that used in ordinary English. The complex format and legal 
terminologies makes legal documents hard to read and interpret [16]. 
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Apart from the document language, the structured format makes the text prone to 
misinterpretations and other ambiguities like cross references and exceptions. The 
document is usually structured into parts (e.g. Part 164 of HIPAA). Each part is then 
divided into subparts, which is additionally divided into sections (e.g. Section §164.528). 
Some sections are also divided into subparagraphs with multiple points in the same 
sentence. This create some inconsistency as some privacy rules are spanning multiple 
points, subparagraphs, paragraphs, or event sections. For example, the subparagraph 
§164.528(a)(2)(ii) contains three points (A), (B), and (C) in the same sentence: “the 
covered entity must:(A)...;(B)...; and (C)...”, where each one of these points defines a 
different obligation that should be carried out by the covered entity [17]. 
Exceptions and Cross-references to other sections add more complexity to the 
modeling process as they require additional processing efforts. References usually entail 
priority between paragraphs and add more clarity to the privacy requirements. However, 
sometimes references might introduce ambiguities due to the possibility of nested and 
multilevel referencing in the form of cross-references [18–19]. Cross-references occur 
when a section or a paragraph in the law is referencing another section/paragraph that has 
a reference to another rule. For example, the subparagraph §164.528 (a)(2)(i) describes 
individuals’ suspension of rights obligation. This right is also addressed in a different 
paragraph as highlighted by the phrase “as provided in §164.512(d)” at the end of the 
paragraph establishing a reference. Nevertheless, in the subsequent paragraph 
§164.528(a)(2)(ii), the phrase “pursuant to paragraph (i)” is a reference to the preceding 
paragraph. Hence, to model the right indicated in §164.528(a)(2)(ii), we need to refer to 
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§164.512(d) creating an indirect relation between the two paragraphs. On the other hand, 
exceptions are rules that contradict or negate other rules by changing the permissibility 
right or by adding more conditions or obligation. So, if the first rule grants a right to 
access a PHI, the exception would either add more conditions to clarify that right or grant 
permission and vice versa. For instance, §164.512(c)(1) in HIPAA grants the right to 
disclose a PHI if the information is about adult victims of abuse, neglect or domestic 
violence, however, §164.512(c)(1)(ii) presents an exception to this right by adding 
victims agreement as a condition for such a disclosure. 
2.3 Privacy Access Control Model 
2.3.1 Privacy vs. Security 
Privacy and security are two different concepts; however, it’s not easy to 
distinguish the domain of each concept as the literature definitions are not consistent, and 
sometimes the domains overlap. Nevertheless, the need to have a clear definition of the 
privacy concept is required as the scope of this work involves only the privacy section of 
the access control model that represents HIPAA privacy rules. 
According to the International Medical Informatics Association (IMIA), privacy 
is defined as “[having] control over the collection, storage, access, use, communication, 
manipulation and disposition of data” [19]. Other definitions of privacy involve the user 
consent or knowledge of data usage and storage [20–21]. 
In this work, we refer to security as the act of protecting information by providing 
mechanisms for authentication, data encryption, and other related activities, while refer to 
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privacy as the act of protecting information confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[22]. Where confidentiality deals with PHI disclosure, integrity protect PHI against 
unauthorized modification and requires each PHI to be accurate and complete, and finally 
availability prevents withholding of PHI from authorized users when the purpose is 
justified by the law. 
2.3.2 Access Control Models Overview 
In the context of information security, Access control is used in the process of 
determining the permissibility of any access request to perform an operation on a specific 
data object made by a particular authenticated data user [20]. 
To describe an access control models, at least the following three terms should be 
used as a basis for the model: subject, object, and operations on object. Subject refers to a 
system-authenticated data user; it can be another system, a person, or a process. The 
second term is object, which is the protected data itself. Finally, operations describe any 
action that can be performed by the subject on the object. The permissibility to perform 
those operations is managed by Access Rights. Access rights are a set of rules that 
manages the permissions granted to users. 
2.3.3 Simple Access Control Model 
Simple access control model includes only the basic terms as shown in Figure 2.1 
below. This model is used widely in personal computing due to implementation 
simplicity and effectiveness for basic requirements.  The simple access control model is 
generally expressed in the format: 
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ALLOW [Subject] 
TO PERFORM [Operation] ON [Object] 
 
Figure 2.1: Simple Access Control Model 
The simple model is divided based on the implementation method into two 
categories: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). 
Discretionary Access Control relies on direct mapping between objects and 
subjects. The object owner is responsible for specifying the list of subjects that will have 
access to the object. Permission to access an object is left to the discretion of the object 
owner or any subject with a full permission on that object. Most modern personal 
operating systems like Windows and some Linux distributions uses DAC-based models 
for file access control [23]. 
Mandatory Access Control on the other hands relies on predefined ordered 
privacy levels. Subjects and objects are then mapped to a specific security level. In MAC, 
a subject can access all objects with the same or lower privacy levels. Users including the 
object owner do not have the permission to assign the privacy levels of objects. Instead, a 
system administrator is responsible for assigning the privacy level for subjects and 
objects based on the organization requirements. For example, if the privacy levels where 
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Public, Guarded, Confidential, and Highly Confidential, where Public is the lowest 
privacy level and Highly Confidential is the highest privacy level. Then for a user to 
access a confidential document, the user must have a confidential or highly confidential 
privacy level. MAC is usually preferred when confidentiality is the main concern of the 
access control [23]. 
2.3.4 Role-Based Access Control Model 
The simple access control model described in Subsection 2.3.3 is used as base for 
almost every access control model. However, other models evolved from that model to 
solve a specific issue that the traditional model was not able to handle properly. For 
example, the Role-Based Access Control model (RBAC), is an extension of the 
traditional model with the same three basic terms, but the subject designation is different 
as shown in Figure 2.2. While in the traditional model the subject is tied to the data user, 
RBAC defines the subject as the user role [24]. The change was made to solve the issue 
where users’ permissions change based on their roles in the system, and hence, the access 
control should check the user role instead of the user identifier. A typical RBAC access 
right rule is generally expressed as: 
ALLOW [Role] 
TO PERFORM [Operation] ON [Object] 
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Figure 2.2: Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Model 
 
 
2.4 Law Formalization 
The U.S. federal regulations documents follow a formal structured format. The 
legal text is dense and written in a technical language known as legalese. The problem 
with legalese is that it’s too complex, dense, and opaque.  The complex format and legal 
jargons prevent the document from being used as a guide by software engineers and 
technology professionals during the software development lifecycle. This complexity 
leads to the need to formalize the laws into a more computer-friendly format that can be 
easily applied to existing or new software systems and to simplify software law 
compliance tasks. Apart from the document language, the structured format allows for 
other ambiguities like cross references and exceptions. 
2.4.1 Privacy Rules Extraction Methods 
Several researches have already analyzed laws and regulations to extract rights 
and obligations form the text of the law. Common approaches used natural language 
patterns to model the law and extract the context from the legal text [15]. The process is 
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based on identifying patterns in any legal document, then formulate that pattern as a 
template. The template is used in a parser that analyzes the document to extract the 
required information. 
In addition to natural language patterns, Hohfeld legal taxonomy can be used to 
elicit security and privacy requirements from the legal text as illustrated in the work of 
Islam et al. [25]. Islam proposed a method that uses a parser to systematically analyze the 
legal text and extract the core elements and dependencies. Elements such verbs, objects, 
goals, conditions, and scopes are used to identify dependencies and elicit the system 
requirements based on the legal concepts [25–26].  
Siena et al. work [27] also used Hohfeld legal taxonomy for security and privacy 
requirements extraction from the text of the law. Their work is based on the identifying 
the object, subject, and nature of the right from the legal text. The approach tries to fill 
the gap between intentional compliance with the law and how the regulatory knowledge 
is represented in the system. 
 Jorshari et al. work [28] extended Islam [25] work by eliciting the security 
requirements from the law. The work enhanced the extraction process by adding a 
process that ensures resolving dependencies and elements extraction. The model also uses 
agent-oriented approach and extends Secure Tropos methodology [29] for regulatory text 
analysis purposes. 
The Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) was proposed by 
Dorimont et al. [30] to model regulations and form goals. Those goals are then refined in 
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an incremental manner until all the related actors and task are discovered and added. The 
approach was applied in the context of the SAFEE project to model the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) security regulations for civil aviation. 
May et al. [31] “Privacy API” introduced an access control model and extracted 
the privacy requirements from the legal text. The modeling and extraction approach 
followed a procedure of converting laws into commands to keep the extraction tightly-
coupled with the original text of the law. Each paragraph is translated into one or multiple 
commands depending on how many actions they allow or deny. 
2.4.2 Privacy Policy Expression Languages 
To express the privacy policies policy in web services, the formalized HIPAA 
rules should be formatted as XML. This restricts the specification language choice to 
XML-based privacy policy expression languages, specifically P3P, XACML, EPAL, and 
custom XML. In this section we will introduce each language reviewing the possibility of 
using it for privacy policies representation [32]. 
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL): A proprietary privacy policy 
formal language introduced by IBM. EPAL focuses on the privacy authorization and 
permission independently from the deployment details like data structure and 
authentication method [33]. 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P): the P3P was developed by a 
working group at W3C. The purpose of the language was express web sites privacy 
policies and practice [14].  
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eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML): is an OASIS standard 
markup language used as policy expression language, and also as an access control 
decision request/response language [32]. 
Custom XML: The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) is a human/machine 
readable language that can be extended to support any data structure based on a unified 
format. Hence, for the purpose of this research we can create a custom law-compliant 
privacy policy expression XML format to support our work and specify the required 
features. However, such a format will lack two core features present in the above 
languages: standardization and general acceptance. 
2.4.3 Privacy Policy Logics 
DeYoung et al [7] proposed a complete HIPAA and GLBA formalization of all 
the rules and introduced a new logic called “PrivacyLFP” based on the least fixed-point 
logic. But the logic is not designed for web services and can’t be transformed easily to 
XML. However, most of the points outlined in the formalization process will be very 
useful in this work for developing our actual model based on the conceptual model. 
Lam et al [12] work presented the pLogic for HIPAA formalization by identifying 
a specific fragment of stratified Datalog with limited use of negation. There work only 
used the parts §164.502, §164.506, and §164.508 of HIPAA and the main concentration 
was on medical data messaging with no carried-out obligations.  
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May et al [31] work introduced a new framework called “Privacy API” with 
HIPAA formalization method using HRU Access control model. However, the model is 
incomplete as it only formalizes on HIPAA rule (§164.506). 
2.5 Web Services and Access Control 
To implement the privacy access model to web services, we need to examine web 
services architecture to find the best place to enforce the access model. The web service 
conceptual model consists of six layers: Discovery layer, Message layer, Service layer, 
Security layer, Policy layer, and Privacy layer. Each one of those layers is supported by a 
corresponding XML standard in the implementation model as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3: Web service conceptual and implementation models mapping 
The discovery layer is used in web service finding with the means of UDDI, 
where the message layer is used for binding web services through SOAP implementation, 
and the service layer is used for publishing using WSDL, and the security layer 
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implements the OASIS approved WS-Security standards to safeguard the web service. 
This leaves only two layers as a prospect layers to implement a privacy access model: the 
policy layer and the privacy layer. However, both of those layers lack an approved 
standard implementation language. For the policy layer, the currently proposed WS-
Policy does not meet the interoperable and non-propitiatory framework requirements as it 
was not published by a standard organization and is not adopted by any significant group 
of vendors [34] and there is no complete approved implementation of WS-Security for 
the security layer [35]. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Research Plan 
The research went through multiple iterations until it reaches the current state. It 
started as a conceptual model and evolved into a more sophisticated system 
implementation. The first step was to create an abstract theoretical model for a generic 
HIPAA access control that utilizes web services as a gateway to control access to any 
covered entity existing resources in compliance with HIPAA. Then we identified the 
model components where each component represents a milestone in the project roadmap.  
The main components were treated as individual research items; it has its own literature 
survey, implementation, and test plan. Then we combined the components together again 
to form the final model as one entity. Those components are identified based on a 
function-oriented engineering process and are classified as: privacy rules extraction and 
formalization, privacy policies formal expression, access model logic, and the web 
service design and implementation. 
3.2 System Architecture 
The system introduces the idea of an access model that can be implemented as a 
privacy-wall between users’ request and any covered entity existing system as shown in 
Figure 3.1. When any resource access request is created, it must go through the privacy-
wall before reaching the resource. The same logic is applied regardless if the request is 
for a PHI internal usage or external disclosure [36]. 
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Figure 3.1: Access model abstract design 
3.3 Extracting and Modeling HIPAA Privacy Requirements 
3.3.1 Access Request Context 
Privacy Access Control is an access control where the access right rules are 
expressed based on set of privacy rules. It is a typical access control; however, it relies 
and aims to protect the object privacy. In this type of access control, the format of access 
right rules is different, as it depends on the user attributes, roles, request purpose, and 
other conditions as shown in Figure 3.1. It also carries out obligations. Powers et al. [10] 
suggested a new format to express privacy access right rules. We added modified the 
access right rule to work [37] with our model and the new syntax is represented as: 
ALLOW [Active Role] 
TO PERFORM [Operation]  
ON [Data Type] 
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RELATED TO [Data Owner Type] 
FOR [Purpose]  
PROVIDED [Condition] 
CARRY OUT [Obligation] 
 
Figure 3.2: Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) Model 
The privacy access rule consists of the following components: 
• Subject: is the data user, however, it’s not tied to a specific user, but rather, to a 
user type or role similar to RBAC roles.  
• Operations: any set of actions that can be invoked on an object, similar to the 
traditional model.  
• Object type: in this type of rules is not tied directly to a specific object, but rather 
to a specific type of object, it can be defined at high-level (i.e. Treatment related 
files), or at a lower-level (i.e. Medical chart files, CT scan images …etc.).  
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• Purpose: This represents how the data user will use the object, or the reason 
behind the request. A purpose can be something like treatment, accounting, legal 
case…etc. [38]. 
• Condition: Any additional rules that needs to be qualified. 
• Obligations: Any additional steps that the system must take after a certain access 
is allowed, this might include logging, object deletion, archiving…etc. 
3.3.2 Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) Model 
The privacy access control model described in the previous section is an extension 
to the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) with the following distinctions: 
1. Instead of relying solely on the requester role, the entire Access Request Context 
(ARC) is used. This makes the access control Context-Based Access Control 
Model (CBAC). 
2. While RBAC is used mainly for security access control, CBAC is used usually for 
privacy access control. 
3. In RBAC, no obligations are carried out by default after granting access. On the 
other hand, CBAC usually carries out obligations. 
To allow access to a specific PHI, the access request context will be analyzed and 
should meet HIPAA privacy requirements. However, to be able to check the 
permissibility of a request against HIPAA, the requirements should be modeled to extract 
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the access criteria. The modeling process will extract all the possible combination of 
roles, permissions, purposes, obligations, and any temporal factors [39–40]. 
3.3.3 The Extraction Process 
The process is broken into two activities:  Model and Analyze HIPAA and 
Identify and Extract the Privacy Requirements. Each activity consists of several steps. 
Figure 1 illustrates the extraction process with the two main activities and shows each 
activity inputs and outputs. 
The purpose of this activity is to overcome the difficulties and issues that 
complicate HIPAA modeling as explained in section II.B. Raw HIPAA rules are used as 
an input to the activity, and then the following steps are performed: 
Step 1: Identify scopes and definitions: the first step is to define the extraction 
scope. In this work the focus will be only on the rules related to privacy preserving and 
PHI disclosure. After analyzing HIPAA rules and eliminating all the abstract, non-
operational requirements and regulations, the extraction will take care of the privacy 
requirements from §164.502, §164.506, §164.510, §164.512, §164.514, and §164.524 of 
HIPAA. 
Step 2: Identify and replace rules dependencies, cross-references, and exceptions: 
the purpose of this step is to formalize the subset of rules selected in step 1 and to add 
more clarity to the legal text. This is achieved by replacing cross-references, self-
references, and dependencies with the exact definition from the reference or by using a 
similar meaning to improve the rule text less readability. Alternatively, if the reference is 
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identified as a condition it might stay in-place to be processed in a later stage of the 
modeling process [41]. 
The output of activity one is a reference-free subset of HIPAA rules that is 
focused only on privacy preserving. This output will then be used as one of the inputs of 
the next activity. 
3.3.4 The Modeling process 
Once all the rules are elaborated and modeled in a clear way in activity one, any 
additional organization or business-related privacy rules are then analyzed. Combined 
with the rules from activity one, all the rules are used as an input to activity two. 
 The purpose of this activity is to perform the extraction process. Like the 
previous activity, this activity consists of multiple steps where the final step is the actual 
context elements extraction. Before that, any business-related privacy rules are analyzed. 
Then combined with the subset of HIPAA rules, all ambiguities are eliminated. Next, the 
text is parsed to highlight phrases that might constitute a possible element. Figure 3.3 
outlines the components of the rule §164.528 (a)(2)(i) of HIPAA. 
Step 1: Analyzing business-related privacy rules: In addition to HIPAA rules, 
most covered entities have their own privacy policies and rules that their system users 
must agree upon in order to use the covered entity software application. During this step 
the covered entity privacy policy can be analyzed and prepared for the modeling process. 
However, this step is optional as such a privacy policy can be formalized separately and 
then the two privacy policies can be combined using a combining algorithm [42]. 
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Figure 3.3: An outline of HIPAA rule §164.528 (a)(2)(i) components 
Step 2: Clarifying the ambiguities: The legal text of the law might contain 
domain-specific wording that will require a law professional to elaborate the definition of 
the text. Also, some words might have multiple meanings which will cause an ambiguity. 
At this stage, all the ambiguous words and domain specific words will be elaborated [43]. 
Step 3: Text parsing and elements extraction: in this step all the words and 
phrases in the text of the rule are tested for possibility of being a context element.  
Step 4: Context elements classification: Various methods were proposed for 
elements classifications [44–47]. However, each method solves a specific problem or 
introduces a special notation. For example, Hohfeld classification introduces the notion 
of rights and responsibilities. Hohfeld theory embodies the relationship between actors 
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based on their responsibilities and rights within the legal text context [17]. However, this 
work is more focused on the notion of Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) where the 
main concern is to identify roles, permissions, purposes, obligations, and temporal 
factors. Hence, a Goal-Driven approach can be applied where the goal is to extract the 
CBAC components. Table 3.1 shows an example of elements classification based on the 
data from Figure 2 of §164.528 (a)(2)(i). 
Table 3.1: Elements classification of HIPAA rule §164.528 (a)(2)(i). 
Element Element Classification 
R164_528_a_2_i Rule Id 
covered entity Role 
 must  Operator 
temporarily  Temporal factor 
suspend rights to receive an 
accounting of disclosure 
Action 
health oversight agency Role 
law enforcement official Role 
(R164_512_d) OR (R164_512_d) Condition 
 
 
3.4 Formally Expressing HIPAA Privacy Policies 
3.4.1 Expression Languages 
In our access control model, we proposed the use of web services as an entry 
point for all access request. The web service will act as a privacy-wall that filters out all 
unauthorized access requests. The access control model will be encapsulated inside the 
web service. The web service policy layer stores the formalized privacy policies, whereas 
the privacy layer will include the logic to enforce those policies [36]. 
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In order to store the privacy policies in the web service policy layer, the 
formalized privacy rules extracted from the previously explained process should be 
expressed as XML formatted policies. This condition restricts the specification language 
choice to be an XML-based like EPAL, P3P, XACML, and custom XML. In this section 
we will review those languages and assess their adequacy to express and/or enforce the 
formalized law privacy rules. 
To compare the XML languages, we need to specify comparison criteria. We will 
rely on the work of Anderson [33]. Anderson outlined 8 criteria to compare policy 
expression languages. Those criteria are based on the language features and ability to 
express privacy policies. We extended the criteria to include a standard recognition and 
the ability to use the language without obtaining a prior agreement between the model 
users. Also, we will extend the comparison to include P3P and custom XML in addition 
to the EPAL and XACML. Table 3.2 shows a comparison between the four remaining 
language. 
Based on the comparison, we chose to use XACML due to it standardized nature 
and extensibility, also as it will allow expressing the privacy policies as well as the access 
request. While custom XML was very close to XACML, however, it was ruled out as an 
option due to its inability to express directly enforceable policies, and the fact that it will 
require prior approval from its users [48]. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of standard privacy policy expression languages 
 XACML EPAL P3P Custom 
XML 
Developed by OASIS IBM W3C N/A 
Standard status recognition Yes Yes Yes No 
Proprietary No Yes No No 
Can express privacy policies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can express directly-enforceable 
policies 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Can express access request / 
response 
Yes No No Yes 
Support constraints on Subject Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Platform independent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Can be extended Yes No No Yes 
 
3.4.2 Extending XACML to Support CBAC 
Based on the Context-Based Access Control Model (CBAC) proposed previously, 
XACML access request should be extended to contain all the extracted context attributes. 
The XML fragment shown in Figure 3 include a sample XACML request [36]. 
As illustrated in the access request shown in Figure 3.4, the user id (Dr. Doe) and 
role (Doctor) are included in the access request nested under the subject attributes. The 
action consists of two parts, the action type (read) and the request purpose (Treatment). 
While finally the resource specifies a private document (patient medical record). The 
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extended XACML request might also include additional conditions and temporal factors 
as well. 
 
Figure 3.4: Sample XACML extended request: Dr. Doe requesting a medical record 
Out of the box, XACML access response will includes two values: the request 
status and the request decision. The status will return the request status code where OK is 
equivalent to the HTTP code 200. The decision will specify the permissibility of the 
request. XACML allows the use of one of four values: Permit, Deny, Indeterminate, or 
Not Applicable [14]. XACML response should be extended also to comply with the law 
privacy rules. In addition to the request decision answer, it should also include any 
carried-out obligations. Where obligations define the steps that the requester must carry 
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out after access to the resource is granted. An example of carried out obligation would be 
notifying the patient about the transaction or just informing the system to log and audit 
the transaction [49]. Figure shows a sample XACML response with no carried-out 
obligations. 
 
Figure 3.5: Sample XACML extended response 
3.5 Privacy Access Control Decision Logic 
The access control logic for the model is inserted in the web service. Figure 3.6 
shows the flow of a user request to access a specific resource in the system. When the 
user conducts an access request, the decision engine collects the request context from the 
system resources. The context will include the user identity, roles, temporal factors, and 
other user related data based on the user current role. Then it creates an internal XACML 
formatted access request and sends the new request to XACML decision engine. If the 
request is authorized, then the system passes the resource request to the covered entity 
system for regular handling, otherwise, an access denied response is sent back to the user. 
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Figure 3.6: Access Control Decision Logic 
More fine-grained logic is applied internally inside XACML decision engine. 
Figure 3.7 shows the way we handle the internal XACML access request created by the 
web service. When the internal access request formatted in XACML is sent, the Policy 
Enforcement Point (PEP) receives the request. PEP sends a request to the Policy 
Information Point (PIP) to request attributes. PEP also sends the request to the Policy 
Decision Point (PDP) to analyze the request elements. The PDP will receive the request 
from PEP, the attributes from PIP, and the privacy policies from the Policy Admin Point 
(PAP). It will then use all those to check if the request is permissible and send the 
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response back to PEP. PEP will then format the response in XACML and send the 
internal response to web service. 
 
Figure 3.7: XACML decision engine 
3.6 Logical Specifications of HIPAA Rules 
The logical specifications will follow a similar path. We will identify the systems 
agents, attributes, the roles, the purpose, and the relationships between them all. 
3.6.1 Agents, Attributes, and Knowledge States 
Agents is a set of population (P), this set includes individuals (patients) and 
covered entities as well. For each agent in the set, there are attributes associated with that 
agent. Attributes can be Protected Health Information (PHI), or other attributes that can 
identify an agent. A knowledge state is a set of triples that indicate an agent p knows the 
value of an attribute t of the agent q. We can formally express the above as: 
Let P be a set of agents (e.g. p, q), 
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      T be a set of attributes (e.g. t1, t2) about agents 
      K be a set of knowledge states 
Then K ⊆ P X P X T 
If an agent p knows the value of an attribute t of agent q then: (p, q, t) ∈ K 
3.6.2 Agent Roles 
Agent role is an important factor in the authorization process. Our system uses an 
extended RBAC model that still uses the agent role. However, the access request consists 
of other factors as relying solely on roles does not satisfy HIPAA rules. To formally 
express the roles, then assume that R is the set of roles of all system agents. For example, 
if Bob is a doctor in our system, then:  
Bob belongs to the agents set:  p1 ∈ P,  
and doctor belongs to the roles set: r1 ∈ R 
The relation can be formally expressed as a tuple with the verb inRole. For the 
previous example we can express the relation as  
inRole(p1, r1) where p1 ∈ P, r1 ∈ R. 
By analyzing HIPAA rules, we can see that most roles are generic or at an 
abstract level, hence, we need to provide a structural order in the logic. For example, a 
pediatric role is a specialization of the doctor role. The relation ≤R is used to define roles 
specialization/generalization. If r1 ≤R r2, then the role r1 is a specialization of r2. We can 
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formally express the previous example as, pediatric ≤R doctor. For the purpose of this 
study, access request should be normalized to the highest role in the structure unless if the 
specialization role is mentioned directly in the privacy policy. 
Due to the fact that an agent can have multiple roles in the system, a role state (ρ) 
is required. Role state is the set of all roles for agents as a tuple of agent and role where: 
ρ ⊆ P X R, where (p1, r1) ∈ ρ 
However, for any specific access request, we need to capture the current user role 
from the context of the request. For example, if Alice is a doctor and a patient in our 
system, and Alice is requesting to access her own medical file, then we use the patient 
role in the access request. The context of the request can be formalized as c1, where c1 
belongs to the set of all contexts C. The relation between the agent and the context can be 
formalized as the verb inContext on the tuple (p1, c1) as:  
inContext(p1, c1), where p1 ∈ P, c1 ∈ C 
To make this formalization easier to read, syntactic sugar can be used to create the 
verb inActiveRole which can be formalized as: 
inActiveRole(p1, r1) ≜ inRole(p1, r1) ∧ inContext(p1, c1), where p1 ∈ P, r1 ∈ R,  
(p1, r1) ∈ ρ, c1 ∈ C 
3.6.3 Request Purpose 
In addition to the role, we also check the purpose of the request. For example, if 
Alice is a doctor who is trying to access a patient file, we are required by HIPAA to 
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check the purpose of accessing the file. Being in the role doctor by itself does not 
guarantee proper authorization to access the patient PHI. If the purpose is to treat the 
patient, then we check the corresponding HIPAA rule before granting access to the file. 
To formally express the purpose, we assume that U is the list of all purposes that can be 
used in any given access request. 
3.6.4 Response and Disclosure action 
When an agent request access to a PHI, the decision engine will check the request, 
and if the request is authorized, the response will include the requested PHI as well. 
According to HIPAA rules, this kind of response where the PHI is sent to the requester is 
considered information disclosure. To formally express response, we assume that each 
response (s1) is drawn from a set of Responses (S). Each response s contains a set of 
attributes, if the request is denied, then the set is empty. Because the content of the 
message is about an agent (the patient) and it includes information (attribute) associated 
with that agent, the content of the message can be formally expressed as:  
content(s1) ⊆ P X T 
The action of sending the response is considered as “disclosure action”. The 
relation between a response s1, agent q1, and the disclosed attribute t1 can be defined as:  
contains(s1, q1, t1), where s1 ∈ S, q1 ∈ P, t1 ∈ T, and t1 ∈ phi 
where phi is the set of protected health information attributes.  
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The relation between a purpose and a disclosure action is formalized as a tuple 
(s1, u1). We can say that the purpose u1 was in the request that produced the response s1 if 
forThePurpose(s1, u1) is true where s1 ∈ S, u1 ∈ U.   
3.6.5 Temporal conditions 
Time plays an important role in the authorization decision. Because roles are 
dynamic, time can be used to check the current agent role and make sure that the agent is 
still in the request active role. Also, temporal factors affect the state of an attribute for 
future disclosure. For example, if the value of an attribute was disclosed to an agent in 
confidentiality, then in the future, this attribute cannot be disclosed unless PHI disclosure 
is allowed. Also, past operations can be used to capture any agent pre-authorization to 
disclose PHI within the limits of HIPAA. Numerous temporal logics can be used for 
capturing temporal logic for law formalization. First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) 
is appropriate and can be used for this purpose [7, 11]. The grammar to generate formulas 
is: 
φ ∷= disclose(p1, p2, s1) | contains(s1, q, t1) | inActiveRole(p1, r1) | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | 
φ𝒰φ | φ𝒮φ | ∃x : T. φ 
3.6.6 Norms of Disclosure 
For the purpose of this study, we follow the popular scheme of dividing the norms 
to positive norms and negative norms. Positive norms are HIPAA rules that allows PHI 
disclosure hence granting access when the request fulfil the rule requirements. On the 
other hand, negative norms are those rules that restrict or deny PHI disclosure. In order 
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for any given request to be granted access, it should satisfy at least one positive norm, 
and all negative norms. This means that at least one HIPAA positive rule allows the 
disclosure, and no negative rules deny the request. This can be formally expressed as: 
Positive norms φ+:  
inActiveRole(p1, r1) ⋀ inActiveRole(p1, r2) ⋀ inActiveRole(q, r3) ⋀ (t1 ∈ T) ⋀  (t1 ∈ 
phi) ⋀ θ ⋀ ψ 
Negative norms φ-:  
inActiveRole(p1, r1) ⋀ inActiveRole(p1, r2) ⋀ inActiveRole(q, r3) ⋀ (t1 ∈ T) ⋀ (t1 ∈ 
phi) ⋀ θ → ψ 
Where θ is an agent constraint, and ψ is a temporal condition. 
3.6.7 Formally Expressing HIPAA rules using HPRLSL 
For any given HIPAA rule, we can formally express the rule using the logic 
specified above. The same can be applied to any given request, and the decision engine 
then can use the formalized rules to issue a response. 
Based on the above logical formalization, we can say that any given privacy 
policy can be formally expressed as: 
ℙ ::= ⎕ (∀p1, p2, q | P. ∀s1 : S.∀t1 : T. ∀u1 : U. 
disclose(p1, p2, s1) ⋀ contains(s1, q, t1) ⋀ forThePurpose(s1, u1) → ((∨φi+) ⋀ (⋀φi-))) 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPLEMENTATION AND TEST PLAN 
4.1 Implementation 
The implementation consists mainly of a web service that embeds the XACML 
privacy policies internally in the policy layer and has the logic embedded in the policy 
layer. When invoking any web service method, it internally uses XACML decision 
engine to determine the request permissibility as shown in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: The proposed access model architecture 
. 
This architecture assumes that any request to the system will pass the web 
services. This way the web service will provide the access control mechanism and act as 
an ethical-wall that prevents an unauthorized access to the system. 
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In order to apply the access control mechanism to an existing system, all paths to 
access resources will have to be re-routed through the web service to ensure compliance. 
For example, if the existing system is a web site that is provided by a covered entity to 
access resources on the covered entity system, then one suggested approach is to add an 
http handler that will examine all requests and then re-route all those requests to the web 
services. Once the web service approves the request, then it will log the request to an 
audit logger and re-route the request back to the original path. If the request is rejected, 
then the rejection response is issued back to the original system (the web site in our 
example) to formalize and handle the response back to the client (e.g. response with 401 
Unauthorized request). 
4.2 Test Plan 
To evaluate the proposed access control model, three test plans were developed. 
Each test plan will assess a specific area of the model. The test plans are: policy 
formalization test, policy generation test, and policy reasoning and integrity test. 
4.2.1 Policy Formalization Test 
The policy formalization test is designed to evaluate the extraction and modeling 
processes described in the Subsections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. The extraction and modeling 
process takes HIPAA legal text as an input, applies the process steps, and then return the 
main components in a semi-formalized form as shown in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1. The 
evaluation is based on the work of Kiyavitskaya et al [50–51] on assessing the 
automation of extracting rights and obligation from regulatory text. The procedure 
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quantifies the outputs of the modeling process by counting the number of extracted 
actors, actions, policies, and constraints. Then the results can be compared with a human 
extracted data to confirm the accuracy of the formalized rules. The human extracted data 
used in the test comparison were reported by Breaux et al [17] which was collected 
through an extensive survey on a set of students. 
4.2.2 Policy Generation Test 
As explained in section 3.4, the formalized HIPAA rules will be finally expressed 
as an extended-XACML policies. In order to convert the semi-formalized policy 
components extracted by the extraction and modeling process, a policy generator was 
used. The policy generator job is to apply the first-order temporal logic and convert the 
legal text components into a well-formed corresponding XACML policies. 
The policy generation test is planned as a measurement to quantify the number of 
norms, current states, and generation time for any given policy, then we compare that 
results with the original HIPAA legal text as well as with the generation time from 
similar models. 
4.2.3 Policy Reasoning and Integrity Test 
The policy reasoning and integrity test aims to evaluate the system logic and 
reasoning time and to ensure policies integrity. This test is based on a simulation 
application that uses the extracted context from the extraction process to create random 
access requests. Every request invokes the web service and logs the response a long with 
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the processing time. All the results are then checked to calculate the response reasoning 
and logic time and number of policies checked. 
Each generated request will consist of: the requesting agent identity, role, purpose 
of request, and the desired action formatted in XACML. The request components domain 
is a subset of the extracted HIPAA components, where: 
• Identity: The agent identity is randomly generated. The identity property is added 
to the request to differentiate between requests. In real-life applications the 
identity is very important as it’s tightly-coupled with the agent relation to the 
covered entity and also its role in system. However, for this simulation test, we 
assume that the agent current role is the same as the role exclusively encoded in 
the request. 
• Role: The agent role r1 belongs to the HIPAA identified roles set R (r1 ∈ R). We 
apply role abstraction method to generalize the role to highest possible level, for 
example a pediatric role is generalized to a doctor role. However, the original role 
is still maintained in request as it might have a significance in the law, for 
example, a pediatric is not allowed to review psychiatric notes. 
• Purpose: as explained previously, the request purpose is used as one of main 
criteria in determining the request permissibility. Similar to roles, the purpose p1 
belongs to the general set of HIPAA identified purposes P (p1 ∈ P). 
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Based on the analysis above, the test will contain a set of requests Q, each request 
q1 can be formally expressed as tuple qi (pi, ri, pj) where qi ∈ Q, pi is a randomly generate 
identity, ri ∈ R, pj ∈ P. 
As an initial hypothesis, we expect that any request reasoning time should be 
equal to or less than 0.1 seconds. To generate a statically acceptable sample request, 
power analysis is used to calculate the sample size for the simulation application. Power 
analysis or statistical power is the probability that a null hypothesis H0 will be rejected if 
an alternative hypothesis HA is confirmed to be true [52]. To calculate the sample size, 
we use the initial hypothesis as a starting point that reasoning time should be less than or 
equal to 0.1. We also assume that the required level of confidence is within 2 standard 
deviations around the mean, which is statistically (95.45%) or simply just 95%. 
The statistical hypothesis for this work is as follows: 
H0 → μs > 0.1 ………………………………………… (0.1) 
HA → μs ≤ 0.1 ………………………………………… (0.2) 
Where μs is the expected average reasoning time for any given request qi, H0 is 
the null hypothesis that assumes for any given request the reasoning time is greater than 
0.1 seconds, which is exactly the opposite of our initial hypothesis HA. 
We apply the numbers into the statistical power formula to calculate the sample 
size n as: 
n = (N*S*(1-S)) / (((N-1)* (α2 / Zα/22)) + S*(1-S))………………… (0.3) 
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Where N is the general population size of all possible requests, S is the effect size, 
α is the complement of the confidence, and Z is the t-value of α/2. 
To compute N, the general population size, we need to find the number of 
elements in the set of all possible requests Q.  
Q = {R X P} ………………………………………………… (0.4) 
By checking HIPAA extracted components, we find that the size of Q is 900. 
In order to find Zα/2, first we need to calculate α which is defined as: 
α = 1 – β ………………………………………………… (0.5) 
Where β is the required level of confidence, which we assumed is 95% so: 
α = 1 – 0.95 = 0.05 
α / 2 = 0.05 / 2 = 0.025 
Zα/2 is Z0.025 by looking up the value for Z0.025 in the t-table we find that the 
value is: 
Z0.025 = 1.96 
To calculate the value of the effective size S, we relied on Thompson [53] 
justification of using the t-test on means for large test size. Based on that and by checking 
Cohen’s [52] table for effect size values (Table 4.1 below), we can assume that: 
S = 0.8 
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Table 4.1: Effect Size Values 
 Effect size Index Small Medium Large 
t-test on Means D 0.20 0.50 0.80 
t-test on Correlations R 0.10 0.30 0.50 
F-test ANOVA F 0.10 0.25 0.40 
F-test regression f2 0.02 0.15 0.35 
Chi-Square test w 0.10 0.30 0.50 
 
By applying the numbers to the equation 4.3, the sample size is: 
n = (900*0.8*(1-0.8)) / (((900-1)* (0.052 / 1.962)) + 0.8*(1-0.8)) = 193.2775153 
The result is rounded up to get a whole number 
n = 194 sample size 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Test Results 
As explained in the test plan in the previous chapter, three tests were designed to 
assess different aspects of the proposed model. The first two are designed to test the 
formalization and generation processes, which will test the in-term procedures followed 
to create the policies. Where the third test will perform a simulation to evaluate how the 
access model will behave to response for access requests. 
5.1.1 Policy Formalization Test Results 
Following the test plan described in 4.2.1, the extraction process was applied to a 
selected set of HIPAA privacy rules to model and extract the context components. The 
test results are then compared to a human extracted context reported by Breaux et al [17] 
to evaluate the formalization process. Table 5.1 shows a sample of the test results 
showing the rule id, the count of agents, roles, temporal factors, and purposes. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample results of extraction and modeling test for rule 164.512 
Extraction 
method 
Agents Specialized 
Roles 
Generalized 
Roles 
Temporal 
Factors 
Purpose 
Automated 4 5 3 1 Treatment 
Human 4 4 2 1 Treatment 
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5.1.2 Policy Reasoning and Integrity Test Results 
A simulation application was created to produce a total of 194 access requests, 
each request contained a unique tuple of agent identity, agent role, and the purpose of the 
request. The values are randomly selected from lists containing the entire extracted 
population from HIPAA rules. The simulation application logs all the results including 
the reasoning / response time, the number of policies checked, and the response text to a 
file. Table 5.2 shows a sample of the simulation application output. 
 
Table 5.2: Sample results of Access Request Simulation showing response time 
Request Id Response / 
Reasoning Time 
Number of 
Policies checked 
Response results 
59 0.0917  95 Permit 
60 0.0858  93 Deny 
61 0.0963  96 Deny 
62 0.1047  97 Permit 
63 0.1031  96 Permit 
64 0.0904  94 Permit 
65 0.0991  96 Deny 
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To check if the hypothesis that was developed in the test plan is true, we need to 
prove that the null Hypothesis H0 is false, or the alternative hypothesis H1 is true: {H0 is 
false | H1 is true}. Because the null hypothesis H0 → μs > 0.1 uses the greater than 
operator, we need to perform a right-tailed test. So, in order to reject H0 and prove its 
falseness, t-statistic t* should be less than the critical value t for H0 where: 
t-statistic t* = ( ̅x    μs) / (σ / √ n) 
Critical t = TINV(α, df) 
Where ̅x is the statistical mean, σ is the variance, n is the sample size, df is the 
degree of freedom. The following statistics were calculated from the test results: 
Mean (̅x) = Σx / n = 17.856 / 194 = 0.091569231 
Standard Deviation (σ) = Σ(x   ̅x) / n = 0.006893176 
Degree of freedom (df) = n   1 = 194   1 = 193 
Significance (α) = 1   β = 0.05 
Standard Error (Sx) = σ / √ n = 0.000493631 
Critical t = TINV(α, df) = 1.972267533 
Statistic-t t* = (̅x    μs) / (σ / √ n) = (0.091569231   0.1) / 0.000493631 = -17.07910654 
Based on the statistics values above, H0 is rejected because t* is less than H0 
critical t as 17.07910654 < 1.972267533. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Conclusion 
In this research, we proposed and implemented a HIPAA-complaint privacy 
access control model for web services. We identified the model components and pointed 
out each component requirements, design, and role in the model. Furthermore, we 
evaluated the previous work and extended it to support our model. 
The research started initially with a theoretical model for a generic HIPAA access 
control that uses web services as a unified entry point. The idea is to regulate access to 
the system resources based on HIPAA privacy rules to ensure compliance with the law. 
The initial conceptual design was then broken into four smaller components: the 
extraction and formalization process, the expression process, the access model logic, and 
the web service. 
To extract and formalize HIPAA privacy rules from HIPAA regulatory text, we 
proposed and implemented a two-step process. The process is based on Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) and followed a goal-oriented role engineering method. The process 
was then applied to HIPAA privacy rules to generate a set of classified elements 
representing the context of the access control model. The elements represent all the 
applicable roles, permissions, purposes, obligations, and any temporal factors. 
In order to express the extracted context in a formal language that can be used in 
the model, we evaluated the current privacy expression languages and compared each 
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language adequacy to represent the privacy policies as well as the access request and 
response. We also considered the use of a custom language format based on XML. 
However, we found that XACML can be extended to express the formalized rules. We 
extended XACML access request, access response, and policy structure to represent 
HIPAA privacy rules. We also utilized XACML ability to implement an external logic 
point to implement our access control logic. 
Then, we implemented the formalized HIPAA privacy policies and the access 
control model within the web service layers to create a complete access control model. 
The web service will store the formalized HIPAA privacy policies in the policy layer, 
while the access control logic was implemented within the privacy layer. 
Finally, three test plans were created to evaluate the system compliance and to 
ensure policies integrity. The tests were designed to assess the context extraction process, 
the policy generation process, and the request reasoning and response time. Also, a 
simulation application was created to mimic real-life access request with a context 
extracted from HIPAA text. The simulation application used the extracted context from 
the extraction process to create random access requests. Every request invoked the web 
service and logged the response a long with the processing time. The preliminary results 
showed a reasonable generation and response time with a 95% confidence level in 
compliance with HIPAA. 
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6.2 Future Work 
Based on the current design and the test results, we identified two possible 
enhancements for the system: automating XACML policy generation and better policy 
integrity check. 
Our current     procedure of converting the letter of the law into XACML policies 
passes through multiple processes. Where the first step is to create the keyword 
dictionary, then apply the two-step extraction process, and finally convert the elements 
into policies. Manual human intervention is required in almost each part of the process. 
However, we should automate the process of converting the context from extracted 
elements to XAML policies. 
The second possible enhancement is to develop a more robust test method for 
policy integrity check. Our current test methodology is based on simulation application 
that creates a random-access request using random context and then we assess the results 
to ensure compliance, integrity, and response time. However, we need to take more 
factors into considerations including context that will check the interaction between 
multiple policies especially if one policy is referencing or represent an exception to 
another policy. 
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